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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

LITTLE COTTONWOOD WATER
\
i
COMPANY, a corporation, and
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
't.

VS.

/

Case No. 7898

SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation, MIDVALE CITY, a municipal·
corporation, and J 0 S E P H M.
TRACY, State Engineer of the State
of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
. The respondents concur with the statement of the case
contained in the ·appellants' brief.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' brief contains, in the staten1ent of facts,
various statements which do not take into account all of the
testimony and evidence presented at the trial, and many statements which are argumentative rather than pure statements
of fact. The respondents feel constrained, therefore, to present herewith their own statement of the facts presented at
the trial of the case.
The Little Cottonwood watershed presents ·several unique
features. It is a canyon in the Wasatch Mountain Range "·hich,
in its latest geological development, has been influenced principally by glacial action. The course of the canyon is relatively
straight from east to west, and it inclines steeply in its westerly
cours~. The bottotn of the canyon is filled with a glacial deposit, which readily absorbs and transmits water. During the
greater part of every .year •all of the surface flow of Little
Cottonwood Creek is appropriated. During the late Fall and
Winter months, all of the surface flow reaching the point
described on the various exhibits and in the testimony as the
((Murray Power Plant Intake" is diverted by means of a concrete dam into a pip·eline which carries such surface flow
beyond the mouth of the canyon and through the Murray 1Sity
Power. Plant. The glacial moraine is crossed at a point n~ar
the mouth of the canyon by a fault commonly known and
referred to as the (CWasatch Fault."
It is acknowledged by all of the persons appearing 111
this matter that the decree of the District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the case of Union and East
Jordan Irrigation. Company v. Richards Irrigation Co1npany,
4
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et ~ , Case No. 4802, con1monly referred to as the tCMorse
Decree," determines the surface rights of the appropriators
of \\~ater in Little Cotton\vood Creek as of the date of the
entry of the decree June 16, 1910. It is furthr acknowledged .
by all concerned that the decree referred to defines the rights
of the appropriators of 303.57 sec;ond feet of the flow of Little·
Cottonwood Creek. It is nowhere stated in the Decree or in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the said case
that there is no unappropriated water in the stream or in the
Little Cottonwood Watershed. The decree merely defines the
rights of appropriators to that date and certainly does not
fo~~close the possibility of any additional appropriations being
made. As a matter of fact, it is conceded by the parties to this
action that during certain · seasons the ·surface flow of Little
Cottonwood Creek exceeds 303.5 7 second feet, and that the
exc~ss over that amount remains unappropriated. It has also
been shown by the expert witnesses for all. of the parties to
th's action that there is a substantial quantity of water which
flows or percolates through the material filling the bottom of
Little Cottonwood Canyon toward the west, crosses the
Wasatch Fault and continues to flow underground and appa~ently forms a part of the underground water in the Salt
L 1{e Valley. This is clearly brought out by the testimony of
the appellants' expert witness, Dr. Marsell (R. 127, 133 and
13 7) and by the testimony of Mr. Ward of the State Engineer's
Office (R. 53, 54, 55 and R. 193, 194). As far as the parties to
this action are concerned, this water which leaves the confines
of the canyon and flo,vs underground across the Wasatch
I

Fault, and thence into the valley, appears without contradiction

to be unappropriated water. It is clearly not included within
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the terms of the Morse Decree, and it appears equally clear
that none of the parties to this action claims to be an appropriator of this water .
.We therefore submit, as an uncontroverted fact borne
out by the testimony of witnesses for all parties concerned in
this action, that there are at least two supplies of unappropriated
water in Little Cottonwood Canyon consisting first of water ·
in the surface stream in excess of 303.57 second feet which,
during certain seasoQs, is not diverted and flows down the
natural w~ter course to Great Salt Lake, and second, of a continuous and substantial flow under the surface of the ground,
across the .Wasatch Fault, and into the underground supply
of Salt Lake Valley. The appellants. seek to place great stress
upon the fact that the source of the water which respondents
seek to appropriate is not shown. We contend that the source
of the unappropriated water is immaterial, and the only fact
of importance ·in this proceeding is the fact that the water
exists and is unappropriated.
The peculiar feaures of the Little Cottonwood watershed
and the fact that during a major portion of each year the surface flow of Little Cottonwood Creek is entirely diverted at
the Murray. Power Plant Divesion Dam through a tight pipeline, furnishes us with a unique opportunity to make a study
of the water, both underground and at the surface, below the
point of such diversion and concurrently therewith. Each of
the respondents, Midvale City and Sandy City, has drilled a
well in the Despain Springs area. The location and nature of
these wells, together with the location and nature of other
features of the area ·which are necessary to the consideration
6
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of this case, are graphically portrayed on Defendants, Exhibit
1. The respondents, after the wells had been drilled and tested,
'vere of the opinion that hitherto unappropriated water could
be appropriated and diverted by means of the wells, and accordingly filed the application for appropriation which is the
subject of this action.
The action of the State Engineer was by no means hasty
or ill considered upon the application of the respondents. On
the contrary~ as stated by Mr. Ward (R. 53), the State Engineer and his staff. considered the matter very seriously over a
period of more than ten years, and required the respondents
to submit more information in support of the application than
would normally be required (R. 62).
In the Fall of 1944, a series of tests were commenced
\vhich were planned and designed to make possible a thorough
and scientific study of the water ·in this area ·by all parties
concerned. All of the parties to this action were notified of
the tests and were given the oportunity to observe all of the
procedures followed by the respondents and to make such
independent tests and observations as they might choose to do.
According to the evidence, representatives of the appellants
\vere fully informed as to the procedures followed and observed the entire proceedings of the respondents during the course
of tqe tests for the ensuing several months. In addition to
observing all activities of the respondents in this area, the
appellants secured the services of Dr. Marsell to make independent examinations, to which he .has testified.
j

It was conceded by all concerned that the pumping of the
wells had an immediate and direct affect upon the flow of
7
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various springs in the adjoining area into the channel of Little
Cottonwood Creek. One of the unique conditions, ho\vever,
\vhich 1nade these tests possible is the fact that Midvale City
and Sandy City, during the time ~hen all of the surface flow
of Little Cottonwood Creek is diverted at the Murray Power
Plant Dam, are the owners of primary water rights in excess
of the total amount which naturally flows to the surface fron1
seeps and springs below the said dam. With the exception of
the North Despain Ditch and the Granite Water Company,
the respondents are entitled, during these periods, to the use
of the entire surface flow of the creek. Therefore, subject only
to supplying the rights of the North Despain Ditch and the
Granite Water Company, the respondents, to the extent that
they were drying up the creek, were merely using a ne\v means
of diverting their primary \Vater rights. The right so to do has
been granted by the State Engineer and affirmed by the District
Court upon appeal.
The tests were carried on under the supervision of the
State Engineer from November, 1944, through April, 1945.
During this period of time, the wells _were alternately pumped
separately and together· so that observa'tions_ could be made.
of the affect upon the water in the area of pumping both
\vells together, . pumping either one separately, and failing
to pump either.
The respondents, during this period of time, maintained
a system of measuring weirs by means of which they could
measure the flow of water· in Little Cottonwood Creek and
the various contributing sources from the point belo\v the
Murray Power Plant Diversion Datn \Vhere water first naturally
occurs in the channel of the creek to the head of the Sandy
8
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Ditch, '"here during all of these periods, the last of the appropriated \Vater is diverted. During the months mentioned, frequent and regular measurements wer~ made of the flow of
\Vater at these various \veirs. The record of these measurements
is graphically portrayed in Defendants' Exhibit 2. During
the same period of time, Dr. Marsell placed a series of pegs
in the creek channel and other points where the water naturally
occurs in the area, whereupon he n1ade regular periodic measurements of the \Yater level. As stated by Dr. Mars ell, this was not
a test of the quantity of \Vater but was described as an Hinterference test" to determine the extent to which the pumping
of the wells interfered with the natural occurrence of surface
water in the area.
The results of the two tests appear to corroborate each
other in most particulars.
As a result of these examination·s, and as more particularly
appears from the various exhibits on file herein, the following
facts can be drawn:
L When either of the two wells mentioned is pumped,

there is a lowering of the water, table in the immediate vicinity
of the wells, and an immediate decrease in the flow of water
from the springs in the area of the wells into the channel of
the creek. This effect continues for a number of days after the
pumping of such \veils commences and then appears to decrease, or "level off." The pumping of both wells contemporaneously has more effect upon the water table and flow of the
springs than the purnping of either \Vell separately. The
pumping of either well has an immediate effect upon the level
of the \Vater in the other well.
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2. The continuous pumping of the wells during about 75

days of the period during which the tests were carried on
resulted in a yield of vvater approxitnately 0.6 c.f.s. in excess
of the amount which the springs and other sources \vere yielding naturally before the commencement of pumping.
3. The pu1nping was carried on during a period \vhen
normally the water table and the flo\v of water in the creek
channel would be gradually diminished.
4. The pumping lo"rered the level of water at all points
\vhere pegs were driven by Dr. Marsell. The effect upon the
pegs \vas first observed in from 10 to 2 70 minutes after the·
pumping commenced, and the· \Vater completely disappeared
from the surface at the pegs in from 1 to 28 days.
5. The pumping of the wells decreases the flow of spring
water into Little Cottonwood Creek in and below the Despain
Springs area within a tnatter of minutes after the pumping is
commenced. The decrease in the flow of these springs continues
for 5 or 6 days, and then the effect of the pumping seems to
disappear or become very much less noticeable.
6. When the pumps are shut down, the water reappears
at the ground surface at the locations of the pegs placed by
Dr. Marsell in from 4 hours to 8 days.
7. Upon the termination of pumping, the flow

of various

.springs in the Despain Springs area into Little Cottonwood
Creek is resumed and increases sharply within periods ranging
from a few minutes to a few hours. Thereafter, within a few
Jays the flow of these springs is substantially as high, or
higher, than when the pumping is commenced. When the
10
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putnping is terminated, the flow of the Granite Water Company's spring increases \vithin a period of 4 or 5 days.
Mr. Richards and Mr. Ward are both of the opinion,
after their exhaustive research in the area, that the pumping
of the 'vells diverts 'vater which would otherwise flow underground across the Wasatch Fault~ Dr. Marsell is of the opinion
that the pumping of the wells does not have an effect so
'videspread that it affects the wat_er flowing across the Wasatch
Fault. He testified, however, (R. 152, 153) that the wells
in question might be drilled to a sufficient. depth and pumped
in sufficient quantity to interrupt the underflow of the stream
and substantially diminish the quantity of water escaping
through. the fault. There is a difference of opinion between
Mr. Richards and Mr. Ward, on the one hand, and Dr. Marsell
on the other hand, as to whether or not the amount of water
w'ithdrawn by the present wells is sufficient to divert the
\Vater which would otherwise remain unused and unappropriated, · but they agree that at least by deepening the wells
and enlarging the pumping capacity this water can be diverted.
Dr. Marsell also expresses the opinion that a part of the
un\vatered area created by the pumping . of the wells must
be restored by the first water overflowing the Murray Power
Plant Diversion Daf!I and flowing. down the surface channel.
l-Iis own experiments, as well as those conducted by others,
show, however, that within a very short time after the termination of the pumping, water appears at the surface of the
creek channel at the furthermost and uppermost points at
which it occurred naturally prior to the pumping. He has repeatedly stated in his testitnony, and it is reiterated in the
11
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appellants' brief, that water cannot possibly appear at the
surface of the ground until the gravel and other tnaterial
underlying the surface is completely saturated. ·
Dr. Marsell stated in his testimony (R. 75) that his first
investigation of the water in Little Cottonwood Canyon was
in February, 1945, and (R. 128) that he has made no investigation of the flow of water at the Granite Springs and is not
familiar with the springs. It appears that the entire area of
his investigation is that within which he has placed his pegs
and made measurements thereupon. These pegs are all \vithin
the Despain Springs Area, and they all showed the same
effect. His conclusion as to the effect of pumping the v.:ells
beyond these pegs is based entirely upon hypothesis.
Dr. Marsell conducted an experiment. whereby he placed
some water and gravel in a glass beaker and withdrew some
\Vater therefrom by means of a pipette. He attempted to draw
an analogy between this condition and the water naturally
occurring in Little Cottonwood Canyon. However, he testified
(R. 134) that the condition in Little Cottonwood Canyon is
not analogous to a closed vessel but that it is a trough open
at one end through which the water flows and out of which
the water discharges, both at the surface and underground.
It is also stated (R. 13,7) that he has tnade no measurement
of the volume or rate of flow of the underflo,v of Little
Cottonwood Creek.
~lfr.

Ward and Mr. Richards have testified that they have
been actively engaged in observing and working \vith the
\Vaters of Little Cottonwood Canyon continuously for n1any
years.
12
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Other statements and assertions made by the appellants
in their ~tatement of facts are argumentative and will be
dealt \vith in our argument hereinafter contained.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
RELATIVE RIGHTS CONCERNING THE ADJUDICATION OF THE WATERS OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD
CREEK ARE NOT AT ISSUE, AND THERE IS UNAPPROPRIATED WATER IN THE PROPOSED SOURCE.

POINT II.·
WATERS PROPOSED TO BE CAPTURED ARE UNAPPROPRIATED AND NOT PART OF SURFACE OR SUBSURFACE ~/ATERS SUPPLYING LITTLE COTTONWOOD DECREED RIGHTS.

POINT III.
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT THERE
\X! AS UNDEVELOPED AND LOST WATER WITHIN
THE AREA IN QUESTION.

POINT IV .
. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
THE WATER CAPTURED IS NOT OF FULLY APPROPRIATED SOURCES.
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POINT V.
EXHAUSTIVE AND PRACTICAL QUANTITY TESTS
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE RESULTS OF -WHICH
CONCLUSIVELY SHOW UNAPPROPRIATED \Y/AT.ER~
A.RE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT 1'HE APPROVAL OF
i\.N APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE WATER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RELATIVE RIGHTS CONCERl'TING THE ADJUDICATION OF THE WATERS OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD
CH.EEK ARE NOT AT ISSUE, AND THERE IS UN APPRO~
PRIATED WATER IN THE PROPOSED SOURCE.
Virtually all of the argument contained in the appellants'
.brief is based upon the rna jor pretnise that the Morse Decree,
v.; hich adjudicated water rights . in Little Cottonwood Cr~ek

as of June 16, 1910, amounts to an adjudication that there is
no. unappropriated water in the Little Cottonwood Watershed.
It becomes immediately apparent that this is not the ca~e, and
that the major premise of the appellants' entire case fails.
, The parts of the Morse Decree quoted in appellants~ brief
in support of this contention. are as follows:
"Paragraph 35. No one is entitled to. any of the
water of Little Cottonwood except as he may be an
owner in some of the ditches to which water is distributed, and then only as such ditch is entitled to
water as herein found."
· "Paragraph 42. All persons who have any interest
14
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in the wtaer of Little Cottonwood have been duly
served and have either pleaded herein or the time to
plead has elapsed; and no one has any right to such
water except as specified in this decree."
HParagraph 3 5" saying that no one is entitled to such
\Vater except as therein specified, means only that no one is
the O\vner of such \Yater except as so specified. ('Paragrpah
42" also refers only to the ownership of water. An exa~ina
tion of the decree certainly discloses no holding to the effect
that there is no \Vater except as described in the decree, and
such a holding in an action of this character would be improper.
To further point out_ the fallacy of the appellants' position, the court has judicial knowledge of several instances in
which applications to appropriate water in Little Cottonwood
Canyon subsequent to the date of the Morse Decree have
been approved. The case of Whitmore v. Murray _City, 107
Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748; Little Cottontvood Water Company
v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, and Whitmore v. Welch,
114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954, are all cases wherein applications
to appropriate \Vater in Little Cottonwood. Canyon have been
approved by the State Engineer and the approval has been
affirmed by this court. The appellants herein are jointly interested in an application to appropriate 3 second feet of water
\vhich they claim to save by the diversion of water through the
Murray City Power Plant pipeline. The record of this application appears from the exhibits in the instant case. Certainly,
if, as the appellants so earnestly contend, all of the \Vater in
Little Cottonwood Creek and in the entire watershed tributary
thereto \Vere deemed to have been appropriated as of the
date of the Morse Decree, these subsequent applications could
15
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not have been approved. The evidence of all of the expert
witnesses for both parties to this action shows .conclusively,
without controversy, that· there is water which flows underground through the area where the wells are drilled, and
escapes across the Wasatch Fault into the underground basin
below and which, for the purpose of this action, is unappropriated. The evidence further shows conclusively, and \vithout
controversy, that there are times when the surface flow of
Little Cottonwood Creek exceeds the total water decreed to
have been appropriated by the terms of the. Morse Decree.
The appellants attempt to point out that the results of
the decision in the instant case affect vvater rights in canyon
streams from Colliston to Nephi. If this were true, such result
\vould not necessarily be undesirable. The policy of the law,
as stated by our Legislature and in numerous cases by this
court, is to encourage the development and appropriation of
water, and the application thereof to . a beneficial use. The
only question presently before this court, however, is the
respondents' application to appropriate 1 second foot of water
in Little Cottonwood Canyon. The appellants are pursuing
their right to appeal to your Honorable Body as set forth in
Title 100.-3-14, 15, U.C.A., 1943. This court, in Eafdley t'.
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 76 P. 2d 362, said:
((When an appeal is taken . from the decision of
the state. engineer in such a case, the trial court is required to determine the same questions de novo. It
determines. whether the application should be approved
or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties
beyond the determination of that matter. The issues
remain the same upon an appeal to this court. All
16
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that the district court or this court, on appeal fron1
the district court, is called ~pon to do is to determine
'vhether the application ·should be rejected or ap·
proved.'.
1~o

this effect, see Tanner l'. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d
957; Jf7hitmore l'. i11urray City, supra, which were reaffirmed
again by the recent decision of United States L'. District Court
of Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, et al.,
238 P. 2d 1132.

The respondents readily admit the authenticity of the
Morse Decree, have been bound by it in the past, and expect
to continue to abide by the terms therein. (Exhibit 3, R. 13, 16).
\Ve readily concede that the State Engineer cannot remove
vested rights which have been previously established. However, the problem of priorities between appropriators applies
only to vested rights and not to the right to appropriate water
in the future. In this respect, we refer you to Tanner v. Bacon,
supra, wherein the court said:
CCThe statute relating to prtorthes between appropriators applies only to vested rights and not to the
right to appropriate water in the future, which latte.r
right is governed by statute relating to the approval
of application, and hence every person who applies
for unappropriated water does not have under the
doctrine of priority, an unqualified right to have such
application approved. n
To follow appellants' theory concerning the Morse Decree,
or like .decrees, would forever foreclose future applications
for the development of new water anywhere within the geographical confines of a stream of water. This, of course, 1s
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absurd and to pursue such a policy would repeal all the sound .
\Vater law that has been established before and after statehood.
It has been the policy for many, many years to enco~rage new
applications. In one of appellants' own cases, namely, Little
Cottonwood Water Company v. Kimball, supra, the court said:
·'In an arid region water is precious, and it is the
undoubted policy of the law to prevent its \vaste and
promote its largest beneficial use. * * * The legislature
did not intend to vest the power in the state engineer
to determine the relative rights of an old appropriation
against a new appropriation. That is a question which
involves intricate and difficult problems of both law
and fact and its determination is particularly a judicial
function. The state engipeer n1ust in general inquire
into the extent of prior rights but he ·does not have
the facilities to do more than inquire in a· very general
way. Since the policy of the law. is to prevent waste
and promote the largest beneficial use ne\v applications should be favored and in a doubtful case ~hould
be approved.''
To this effect see also Peterson, et al.

t/.

Lund, 57 Utah 162,

193 P. 1087.
This court has noted in previous cases that the filing of
an application and the making of an appropriation are not
one and the same thing. To this effect see Wrathall v. Johnson!
86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755; Sowards, et al. z·. l\1eagber, 3·7 Utah
212, 108 P. 1112.
The court as recently as December 21, 1951, in Amet'ican
Fork Irrigation Co., et al. v. Linke, et al., 239 P. 2d 188, said:
"A judgment reversing State Engineer's order denying application for change of use of appropriated
18
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irrigation water \vill not be reversed on ground that
proposed change \vould invade vested rights of other
than applicants, as a remedy is available, if applicants
interfere with or diminish such rights in executing
plan, particularly where trial court approved application subject to and without prejudice to other's rights
and awarded no vested rights, but simply allowed applicant to proceed with plans specifically conditioned by
court on respecting other's rights."
·
See also Rot:ky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co.,
104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108; Eardley v. Terry, supra; Little
Cottonll'ood Water Co. t'. Kimball, supra, and United States
l'. District Cottrt of Fourth District, et al., supra.
An appropriator of the waters of a river or lake does
not have the exclusive right to manage and control the use
of all the water in the lake or flowing in that river. Such water
is publici juris, and others have the same right to use it as
the appropriator so long as they do not interfere with the appropriator's use. See Salt Lake City and Salt Lake Canal Co.
ll. Salt Lake City Water and Electrical Power Co., 24 Utah 249,
67 P. 672.

POINT II.
WATERS PROPOSED TO BE CAPTURED ARE UNAPPROPRIATED, AND NOT PART OF SURFACE OR
SUBSURFACE WATERS SUPPLYING LITTLE COTTON-.
WOOD DECREED RIGHTS.
The appellants in their argument under Point II commence
by stating the fallacious rna jor premise that all of the natural
19
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fio\v of the creek is appropriated, and go on to attempt to show
that the natural flow of the creek is all of the water in the
\vatershed.
The respondents have not atten1pted, at any point in this
case, to define the natural flow, the surface flow, or the subsurface flow of the creek, and do not attempt now to do so
because we deem any such definition immaterial to the issues
herein.
An examination of the Morse Decree will clearly show,
however, that it defines the rights of persons who have diverted
and appropriated the s."trface flow of Little Cottonwood Creek
by rneans of. open ditches. All of the rights defined therein

are appropriations of water ntJ.turally occuring at the surface
of the ground. No reference is made therein to appropriations
of ttnderground water. Since the date of the entry of the Morse
Decree, the conditions which then prevailed have been altered
principally by the fact that the appellants and others have,
during a part of each year, diverted all of the surface flow
of the stream through the Murray Po'vver Plant pipeline and
syphoned the water so diverted into the Sandy Ditch below
the n1outh of the canyon to satisfy the rights of appropriators
defined by the Morse Decree. Also, since 1910, our concepts
of the nature of underground water and our laws relative
thereto have undergone several important changes. These
changes are represented and illustrated by the enactment, in
1935, of the law comn1only referred to as the ((Underground
Water Law," and which has been codified as Section 100-5-12,
U.C.A., 1943, and othe.r: sections relative thereto. The respondents introduced a copy of the Morse Decree in evidence to
20
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inform the court as to the exiJting Jttrfat.:e rights in Little Cotton,vood Creek. r\s hereinbefore pointed out, any question of
conflicts between appropriators is not a proper issue in this
case. The appellapts argue that the surface flo,v and the underflo'" are indistinguishable. Here, however, we have a condition
"·here the surface flow is entirely diverted and the underground
_,vater is no l.onger Hunderflow" because there is no surface
flow to be supported thereby. The uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that a part of the underground water flowing down
the canyon finds its way to the surface of the creek. in seeps
and springs, but that the rna jor part of it crosses the Wasatch
Fault underground and is lost in the underground basin below.
The authorities cited by the appellants deal entirely with.
cases involving a conflict between respective appropriators of
\Vater. There is no such issue before this court. See American
Fork Irrigation Company, et al., v. Ljnke, et al., supra.
Let us analyze the case of Richards lnv. Co. v. Westview
Inv. Co., relied upon by the appellants in their brief at pages
28-29, wherein reliance is placed upon the following:

·· * * * Any appropriator of water from the central
channel is entitled to rely and depend upon all the
sources· which feed the main stream above his own
diversion point, clear back to the farthest limits of
the watershed."
What is the fact situation in the case at bar and how does it
compare in respect to the case above relied upon by the
appellants? We respectfully subrnit, and such cannot be re..
futed, that results of the investigations and measurements
made by the respondents, which were very ably, completely,
2i
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and graphically presented by Defendants' Exhibit No. 2, as
-vvell as the rest of the evidence adduced, definitely and clearly
show that no one except the respondents and Sandy Irrigation
Company ( rtot a party to this suit) , has the right to divert
\Vater between the Murray Power Plant pipeline intake at the
Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the Sandy. Ditch, and that the
respondents are the only ones able to divert water between
these points. This was admitted by appellants and was stipulated to by them at the trial (R. 14_, 15, 16). Your attention
is respectfully invited to the fact that during the major portion
of the year-namely, approximately from September-·October
to April-all of the creek flow is diverted into the Murray
Power Plant pipeline (R. 30, 45, 62, 70, 194). The State
Engineer's records bear this out and, of course, Your Honorable
Body can take judicial notice of such records.
It will be noted from the State Engineer's records and
from the judgment of the trial court (R. 217) that the respondents are able· to ascertain this additional water only
during the period when all of the flow is diverted into the
pipeline at the Whitmore Oxygen Plant (when the creek is
dry, R. 45), or when the creek exceeds the decreed rights.
This being true, how can the appellants complain of interference where no one else has right of diversion? During this
period (R. 16, 45), the entire normal flow of water is divertecJ
and a tight dam maintained
at the Sandy Ditch (R. 81, 82, 84).
.
Therefore, no one except the respondents is entitled to any
\Vater out of the creek during this period. Furthermore, Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 shows that during the above :mentioned
period, even. with pumps going and with the natural se~pagc
of the creek, the total decreed rights of the respondents and
.
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Union and Jordan Irrigation Cotnpany (who shares a pipeline
\Vith respondents) cannot uniformly be delivered at the Sandy
Ditch (R. 36, 45). It only stands to reason that if the respondents are interfering with anyone we are interfering with our ..
selves. Ho\vever, it \vas conclusively shown by the evidence
. that during this period the respondents, through their pumping
of the wells, could deliver more water at the Sandy Ditch
than could be delivered there by natural means (Exhibit No. 2,
R. 30, 31, 38, 41, 54, 141, 197, 211).
To permit us to prove on our application for appropriation
of additional water certainly cannot be construed as legal
sanction given us to take watet; from underground source by
n1eans of a pretext. Certainly the records show that additional
\Vater was captured (Exhibit No. 2, R. 30, 31, 34, 38, 41, 54,
62, 141, 161) and appellants do not attempt to· refute such
absolute evidence but quite on the contrary adduce only a theo·
retical geological lesson unsupported by data that proves abso ·
lutely nothing. Appellants' own witness testified that their
evidence rested on theory and supposition (R. 176).
If the area in question is like a (!big tub," as outlined by
appellants, then water will be released only ~here holes are
made, and if no holes are made in the tub, then the water
\vill escape over the fault (R. 63·, 205), and be lost in the
valley below. This is admitted by appellants (R. 137, 141,
143, 147, 161, 162, 197). Why not tap it, bring it to the surface and save it? However, the watershed cannot be likened
· to a closed vessel, as set forth in the appellants' beaker experitnent, because it has a poroLiS opening over the fault and the
old canyon creek channel to the south of the Beaver Pond
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Springs, wherein water continuously escapes into the underground basin below. This is supported by Dr. Marsell's testimony (R. 134, 193).

POINT III.
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT TI-IERE
\\//' S UNDEVELOPED AND LOST WATER WITI-liJ'\
THE AREA IN QUESTION.
The appellants seek to lay great emphasis upon the fact
that the- respondents have not tra·ced the source from ·which
the claimed water comes. The source of the water above the
respondents' point of diversion is entirely immaterial in this
case. It was held in W afren lfrigation Company v. Chafleton,
et al., 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, that it was no defense to
plead th,~.t the water that the defendants were ta~ing was
wat~r belonging to an appropriator whose rights were senior
. to the. rights of the plaintiff, for the plaintiff would have
been entitled to the water if the senior appropriator allowed
it to .run past his point of diversion. In this respect see also
Fuller, et al., v. Sharp, et al., 33 Utah 431, 94 P. 813 .. The
only question before the court is whether or not there is unappropriated water at the location of the wells where 've
propose to. divert it. The argument presented in the appellants·
Point III is merely a repetition of the matters which have been
presented by them in Points I and II. This argument has been
answered 1n the respondents' previous points, or will be
answe.red in subsequent discussions.
Appellants again cite cases pertaining to relative rights
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of parties \\·hich have no bearing on the case at bar. We desire
to point out that the case of Silver King Con. l\1in. Co. z·.
Sutton, cited by appellants on page 31 of their brief, is a quiet
title suit case. which is not the fact of this case. Respondents
claim no other interest in adjudicated rights than what they
already have; furthermore, the instant case is not a suit in
equity as the above cited case relied upon by appellants. Citing from appellants' own case at page 684 of 39 P. 2d:
''This being a suit in equity it is our duty to examine
the evidence, determine its weight and reach our own
conclusion with respect thereto bearing in mind, however, the rule so often announced by this court that the
findings of a trial court will not be. disturbed unless
we are of the opinion they are against the clear preponderance of the evidence.''
In this respect, see also Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389,
284 P. 457. Certainly after many years of exhaustive tests,
approval by the State Engineer, and approval by the District
Court, it cannot now be said that we have not met our burden.

POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THA1~
THE WATER CAPTURED IS NOT OF FULLY APPROPRIATED SOURCES.
Appellants allege that the record does not support the
Findings of the court and that the trial court has made certain
conclusions. In such a suit, the District Court performs de novo
the same functions as the State Engineer performs. The issues
25
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to be tried are exactly the satne as they were before the State
Engineer. To this effect, see Eardley t/. Terry, supra, \vherein
the court said:
''When an appeal is taken from the decision of the
State Engineer in such a case, the trial court is required
to ~etermine the same questions de novo. * * * The
issues remain the same upon an appeal to this court."
In determining whether or not an application should be
approved, the issues are outlined by Section 100-3·-8, U.C.A.,
1943. This section provides:
((It shall be the duty of the State Engineer * * * to
approve an application, if ( 1) .there is unappropriated
water in the proposed source; ( 2) the proposed use
will not impair existing rights or interfere with the
more beneficial use of the water; ( 3) the proposed
plan .is physically and economically feasible; ( 4) the
applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works and the application was filed in good faith
and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly."
Requirements numbers 3 and 4 do not appear to be at issue
and therefore are not worthy of much comment. In passing,
let us say that we have the physical and economical means to
develop this .proposed appropriation, the wells are already
there, have been pumped for over 10 years, and measurements
have been made. over a long period of time. Certainly one
cannot say that two small cities with growing pains have
filed this application for speculation.
In determining whether there is unappropriated \Vater,
and \vhether the rights of others 'vill be interfered ,vith, the
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Sup~etne

Court has, on nun1erous occasions, defined the showing \\·hid1 must be made by the applicant. In one of the more
recent opinions, lY/bitrnore z·. Welch, supra, the court said:
HFurthermore, our holdings are uniformly to the
effect that if there is unappropriated water in the
proposed source, an application to appropriate should
not be rejected. In Little Cottonwood Water Co. v.
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P 116, 118, we held that
the state engineer should approve an application to
appropriate water unless * * * it clearly appears that
there is no unappropriated water in the proposed
source * * * But if the question is fairly doubtful
and there is reasonable probability that a portion of
the waters are not necessary to supply existing rights
the engineer should have the power to approve the application and afford the applicant the opportunity
for ~n orderly recourse to the courts, who ·have the
facilities and power to dispose of the matter definitely
and satisfactorily."

·· * * *

since the policy of the law is to prevent
\vaste and promote the largest beneficial use of water
new appropriation (applications) should be favored
and not hindered. In a . doubtful case when the con·
elusion is not clear, it is more consistent with sound
policy and with the general sch~me of the law, to
approve the application to appropriate and afford the
new claimant the legal status and the opportunity to
proceed * * * ."
The doctrine of this case was stated in Rocky Ford Irrigation
Co. z·. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., supra, and reaffirmed again
in Lehi Irrigation Co. ·v. Jones, et al., 115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2d
892.

In the Eardley v. Terry case, supra, the court said:
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qlt seems clear to us that the Legislature intended
that when the application is filed, the state engineer
is called upon to determine preliminarily vvhether
there is probable cause to believe that an application
can be -perfected, having due regard to whether there
is unappropriated water available for appropriation,
whether it can be put to a beneficial use, and whether
it can. be diverted and so used without injuring or conflicting with the prior rights of others. If he determines
there is such probability, the application is approved
and the applicant then proceeds to demonstrate by an
actual use of the rights sought to be acquired that he
is entitled to such rights.,
The mere fact that an application, filed and literally followed through_to proof, might pl~ce the applicant in a position
where he· could interfere with other prior .rights, is not grounds
for rejecting an application. See Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. ~·.
Kents" Lake Reservoir Company, supra, and Whitmore v. Welch,
supra. In the Whitmor~ case, th~ court quoted Section 100-3-3
which in effect states that change applications shall not be
rejected for the sole reason that the change might impair vested
rights -in others, etc._ The court then says:
· «]fa change application must not be rejected merely
because there might be some conflict with vested rights,
·it would seem to follow that an original application
should- not .be rejected when there is unappropriated
water and the only conflict is with the r~spect to the
point of return."
It is not necessary at the application stage of the procedure
to appropriate ·water for the applicant to know every detail
of his final· right. He may file on 2 second .feet of water, not
knowing whether he can appropriate anywhere near that much.
28
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The application is approved, and he proceeds to demonstrate
what can be appropriated without interfering with others.
\\'hen his final proof is submitted, his certificate n1ay issue for
only 1 of the 2 feet applied for. In this respect, see Salt Lake
City. et al., v. Gardner. et al., 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147. Be also
may find that particular diverting works are not adequate,
that a "~ell must be drilled deeper than contemplated, that a
pipeline must be substituted for a natural channel or a dirt
ditch. His application is never rejected simply because these
details are unkno,vn at the beginning. The application should
be approved as filed, even though the State Engineer does not
believe that the entire amount applied for can be perfected.
Thus, in Little Cottonwood z;. Kimball, supra, the court said
that an application should be approved if there was ((any
unappropriated water in the proposed source." Also, in Whitnzore v. Welch,. supra, the court had before it a power filing.
The applicant had asked for a large segment of the stream
taking the water out at one point and returning it at another.
If the application had to finally be approved for the exact
q~antity of water and exact segtnent of the stream applied for,
it would have been necessary to reject it. This is so, because
the point of return \vas so far dov\''nstream that it interfered
\Vith other upstream rights. The court, nevertheless, affirmed
the State Engineer in approving the application, because upon
final proof the water right could be cut down to cover only
that which was available for appropriation. In the instant case,
no upstream or do\vnstream rights \vill be interfered with.
This has been proven.
In Eardley v. Terry, supra, the court pointed out that the
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application is not intended to be a final determination of the
water right. The court, in this regard, said:
tfWere Section 100-3-8, R. S. 1933,, to be considered
. by itself, it might be thought that in determining
\vhether an application to appropriate water should
be approved or rejected, the state engineer, and the
district court upon an appeal from the state engineer's
. decision, should proceed to hear and dis pose of the
matter and .impose upon the applicant the satne burdens as if it were making a final disposition of all
questions growing out of the filing of the application.
But section 100-3-8, supra, does not stand alone. Sections 100~3-16 and 100-3-17 must be considered in
connection therewith. By those sections it is clear
that no final rights are acquired until the proof required by section 100-3-16 is made and a certificate has
been issued by the state engineer. Section 100-3-16
contemplates that the works, by \vhich the \Vater applied for is to be put to .use, must be completed and
the water applied for must be put to a beneficial use
before a completed appropriation giving rights to the
use of the water can be effected. It is also clear that
the original approval of the state engineer has no
efficacy except that it shows that the applicant had
the right to proceed with his application."
There is sufficient evidence available to demonstrate beyond doubt that there is reasonable cause to believe that a
water right can be perfected and this certainly is admitted
by the appellants (R. 137, 141, 143, 147, 161, 162). Time
for submitting proof of appropriation can be extended by
the State Engineer for as much as 50 years from the date an
application is approved, Section 100-3-12, U.C.A. 1943, as
amended.
30
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During the ensuinb years, additional n1easurements and
·study can be tnade so as to kno\v \\' ith altnost mathematical
exactness the quantity of ,,·ater \vhich can be developed through
pun1ping. in addition to that \vhich \Vould have been available
through natural conditions. The respondents, by their testin1ony and through the exhaustive experiments, have shown
this in great detail.
The Supreme Court has for many years recognized that
\Vater \vhich is \Vasted ·by nature is unappropriated; and that
persons \villing to construct the necessary works to save the
\Vater _which nature wastes, may appropriate it. Cases going
back as far as 1916 have recognized this principle. Thus, in
Big Cottonzcood Tanner Ditch Conzpany v. Shurtliff, et al.,
49 Utah 569, 164 P. 856, the court said that where a user is
\vasting water due to a defective or wasteful method of conveyance, another user can improve his methods and himself
ues the water thus saved. See also Salt Lake City, et al., v.
Gardner, et al., supra.
In 1903 in the case of Howcroft v~ The Union Jordan Irrigation Company, 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487, the court said that a person who seeks to save water by piping it across a porous area.
must, in order to sustain his right to watet saved, prove that said
waters were actually lost to prior appropriators. To do this
\Ve can show that said waters would not run above the surface
at a point above the prior appropriators' point of diversion.
The evidence sho\vs that the waters which are pumped from
the wells would not reappear in the channel above ·the diversion point of the Sandy Ditch. This was admitted by appellants'
own \\'itness (R. 137, 141, 14}, 147, 161). Without pumping
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little water accumulates in the creek and reaches the Sandy
Ditch, \vhereas actual careful measurements over periods of
titne show that there can be pumped at least 0.6 cJ.s. more
than would reach the Sandy Ditch by natural means, (Defendants' Exhibit No. 2, R. 22-50) and at no time even by pumping .
could we dry up the creek channel cotnpletely (R. 38). Thus
by allowing the .water to stay . in the underground, it is not
possible to get all of it. A considerable part of it is lost over
the fault area. Much of it simply will not come to the surface.
Existing wells and pumping equipment can, however, greatly
increase the quantity of -water _which can be brought to the
surface above the Sandy Ditch (R. 22-50, 54, 141, 147, 211).
If the diversion works at the Sandy Ditch are interferred w"ith
in any way, the matter can be amply handled by replacemen~.
Salt Lake City has already gone · on record before the
. State Engineer as believing that immediately above this area
-between the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the South Despain
Ditch-as much as 3 c.f.s. is lost in the channel and can be
saved (Defendants' Exhibit No. 9). It has also gone on record
by its application~ that imn1ediately belo~r the Sandy Ditch
over 3 c.£ .s. sinks into the channel and never again reappears
in the surface stream above the point of diversion. It apparently
denies that the immediate strip loses .any water. The evidence
very emphatically demonstrates that it does; that by pumping
these underground sources through devel~pme~t · of wells,
water which would not otherwise

be

available for use by any-

one is brought to the surface and can be place to beneficial use.
We respectfully call your attention to Defendants' Exhibits
10, 11, 12, 13, and 1.4. An analysis of these exhibits indicates
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the very inconsistent policy t1ken by appellant, Salt Lake
City. Exhibits 10-1.1, inclusive, are ans,vers to protests received
\\·hen Salt Lake City filed to appropriate 5 c.f.s. (Defendants'
Exhibit No. 9) between the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and
the South Despain Ditch. The appellant, Salt Lake City, in
ans,ver to the protests of Little Cottonwood Water Company
and Union and Jordan Irrigation Company (Defendants' Exhibits 10-12, inclusive), said:
ttThat the water feeding the springs and seeps which
supplies part of the primary flow of the creek, is not
the same \Vater that is sought to be appropriated under
this application. This fact is evident because the water
from said springs is much colder than the creek water
during the summertime and flow from said springs
and seeps is practicaly constant while that of the creek
varies with the result that the loss in the channel varies
without affecting the springs; furthermore, the amounts
of water flowing from ·said spring and seeps is much
more than that lost in the streambed which further
substantiates the fact that these waters are unrelated.·'
Salt Lake City, in ans\ver to the protest of Sandy City, Midvale
City, and the Sandy Irrigation Company (Defendants' Exhibit i3), said:
«<That the applicant (meaning Salt Lake City) hereby
claims that the water which issues in the form · of
springs below the point of diversion of the South Despain Ditch (meaning Despain Springs) is not the
same water that is lost in the channel outlined in the
application, but claims that these springs, \vhich unquestionably contribute. to the primary flow of said
creek, are fed by water from other sources. That this
fact is substantiated by residents in the vicinity of
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these springs and further by the fact that the flo\v frorn
said springs is comparatively steady while the streatn
flow fluctuates; furthern1ore, during the sumn1ertin1r~
the water from the springs is colder than that ·of the
creek and· the flow from the springs is much more than
that of the seepage loss, which tends to further substantiate the claim that these \vaters are unrelated.''
(Italics added.)
Yet Salt Lake City, in their protest against the respondents'
application (Defendants' Exhibit No.8), said:
''That the protestant (meaning Salt Lake City) maintains and believes that some of the said water now
being lost ~y seepage is the same water that applicant
proposes to pump from wells under this new application." (Italics added.)
To say the least, ·these positions taken by the appellant, Salt
Lake City, are ce~tainly diaiJ:?.etrically opposed. Are ·we to be
so naive as to believe that the appellants can save 3 c.f.s. between the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the South Despain
Ditch and can save below the Sandy Ditch and yet that there
is no additional water to be. captured between the South
Despain Ditch and the Sandy Ditch? Most certainly not.
It is only necessary, under the cases noted above, for the
applicant to sho"v that there is reasonable ground for believing .
that an appropriation can be n1ade. Cases 'vhere persons saved
vvaters wasted are Little Cottontvood W ctter Co. v. Ki1nball.
supra, and Yates v. Newton; 59 Utah 105, 202 P. 208. In the
Nevtton case, it appeared that plaintiffs diverted all of the water
from a canyon or creek which had a gravelly bed and the plaintiffs argued that the evidence showed that there was no water
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running to \Vaste in the canyon. The argun1ent \Vas that any
effort on the part of the defendant to conserve or gather waters
\vhich seep into the gravelly bed of the stream v.'ould interfere
'vith the rights of the plaintiffs. The court held that only by
experimenting could it be determined whether or not water
could be conserved and if the defendants wanted to try to
conserve the water they were entitled to do so.
Appellants, at page 34 of their brief, allege that no evidence was adduced to show where the additional water came
from and also allege that the water captured by respondents
would reappear in the channel at the Sandy Ditch, a distance
of 6400 feet. A check of Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 will show
this distance to be not over 5,000 fe~t. It is very evident from
respondents' Exhibit No. 2 and testimony given by Mr. Richards, Mr. Ward and by appellants' own witness, Dr. Marsell
(R. 22-50, 62, 63, 137, 141, 143, 147, 161, 162) that the
water captured is water that would escape into the valley
west of the fault area if not taken out above, and therefore
it was impossible for the water captured to be part of the
water that might appear at the Sandy Ditch. Furthermore,
we definitely showed that the. water taken was the escaping
water because the voids arid spring area were recharged almost
immediately (R. 40, 49, 161, 190), and therefore were not
necessary for surface carrier water.
Exception is taken to the statement by appellants ( appellants' brief, page 35) that the pumping adversely affected the
\Vater supply reaching the Sandy Ditch. This statement is absolutely false and an analysis of Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 will
emphatically refute such contention. More water was de-
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livered at the Sandy Ditch at all times when the pumps were
operating than when they were not.
The appellants attack the validity of tests made by engineers for the respondents. These tests were made by Mr.
Richards, who has dealt prirnarily with water and water courses
and has been very familiar with water conditions in Little
Cottonwood Canyon for the past 50 years (R. 17, 18, 19),
and under the supervision of Mr. Ward, who has studied and
worked with water in the State of Utah for over 20 years,
a large part of which work has been conducted in Little Cottonwood Canyon (R. 60, 201). Appellants rely heavily on the
testimony concerning the peg test conducted under the supervision of Dr. Marsell. Let us look at this test .for a moment.
You have the true facts that all of the surface flow is being
diverted through the pipeline and the only wa~er which is in
the creek from the Whitmore Oxygen Plant to the Sandy
Ditch is a minute amount that seeps or percolates therein,
and the fact that no one else but the respondents can divert
water between these two points. Further, you have the fact
that pumping and exhaustive experiments, by the respondents,
took place during. months when no water was in the creek.
, What more ideal situation could exist (R. }0, 70) ? During
the winter months there is a normal seasonal fluctuation
'vherein the surface beds will normally dry up. The evidence
adduced by the respondents very emphatically showed that the
recovery rate of the well voids and seepage was almost instantaneous (R. 40, 47, 48,. 149) and this was not refuted but
acquiesced in (R. 129, 132, 141, 156, 190), thereby indicating
the capture of water that never \vould come to the surface.
Exhaustive tests \vere made by respondents, which included
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the entire area fron1 the \veils to the Sandy Ditch (Defendants'
Exhibit No. 2). Tests \vere tnade over n1any years (R. 38, 49,
61) \Yith one \vell pun1ping, then t\\'O wells pumping. Many
weirs \vere installed, results \vere charted and measurements
taken between given points (R. 22-50). All of this was done
at great expense to the respondent (R. 202). All the appellants did \Yas to place pegs a few inches in the streambed
around the \Yells. No other measurements of any kind were
shown. This is evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Marsell
(R. 138, 171, 193, 194, 195). No measurements or tests were
made by the appellants to refute the tests of the respondents.
No measurements were taken of the flow over the various weirs
all down the creek to the Sandy Ditch. Then how can appellants, in good conscience, say that the respondents' tests are
of no value? Admission was made by Dr. Marsell that recovery
of the voids created by pumping was very rapid when the
pumps stopped and the only exception that" could possibly
be taken is that some of the pegs were not re-covered with
water. We, of course, submit that this condition was a normal
seasonal fluctuation. The seepage of the creek bed is not _lhe
same daily throughout the year and the water in the creek
normally goes down during the time when the appellants
made their tests (R. 27, 33, 34, 35, 49, 62, 138, 156, 206).
lfo,v can anyone say that the underground water moves at
a rate of 2 feet per day without more tests? Can anyone see it?
Is the source of supply in any given area the same 200 feet
away? How can anyone say that the subsurface material is
the same aU· over within a given area? One need only look at
Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 and R. 190 to see that .this is
not true. There is a rocky bed approximately 900 feet in length
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just a short distance west of the Despain Spring Area which
is of different formation than. the Spring Area and the rest
of the area. This area has an actual loss of water (R. 42).
Also, there are natural losses and fluctuations all down the
creek (R. 43). By way of cotnparison, appellants' testimony
revealed no facts that were not explained and plainly illustrated by respondents' exhibits which were the results of
careful and accurate measurements of the flow of creek water
above and across the Wasatch Fault area. Except for some
observations and measurements of the elevation of water
surfaces as they appeared in one shallow well immersed in a
corrugated pipe, and in a few places along the creek where
water accumulated and ran down the channel and in soine
spots ponded up to a depth of about one foot, the appellants
produced no factual evidence that is helpf~l in determining
the actual amount of water that Little Cottonwood Creek
does or can yield under various conditions. A very interesting
theory of prehistoric water erosion and glacial action in the
canyon, and even other canyons, was given stating that below
the present streambed from the Whitmore Oxygen Plant to
the Wasatch Fault there now e~ists a deep glacial and water
deposit of material, estimate.d to be 200 to 300 feet deep, and
that this body of material rests on bedrock; that during the
time when there is enough water flowing in the creek to entirely
saturate or fill the voids in this great" mass of material up to
the level of the creek bed the water will appear in the creek
channel; that the Murray Power Plant Dam is constructed
· on top of this uncompacted tnaterial of great depth, and an
unknown amount of _water is running under it tending to fill
the voids. in · the deposit between there and the Wasatch
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Fault; that the ground \Vater surface produced by this subsurface flo,v is practically parallel to and slightly below the
botton1 of the creek v.r hen all of the water flow in the creek
at the Murray Plant pipeline is div~rted therefrom; that the
hydraulic grade of this ground \Vater surface outcrops at the
Despain Springs area and against the Beaver Pond Springs
and that all the subsurface \Vater which does not appear at
these points disappears into the Wasatch Fault.
This is of course an interesting description of an· undemonstrated condition. Appellants' main. witness testified
that no other tests were made than tlie peg tests (R~ 171, 193,
194). No sample of the earth, no evidence of the depth of
the bedrock is produced. No evidence was produced as to
the depth of the cartyon fill, the actual amount of .water flowing beneath th~ surface of the ground, the nature of water
movement, or the portion of the water flowing underground
which appears at the surface in the above mentioned spring
area. Whether these spring areas ·yield 1070 of the underground flow or 907o of the underground flow, we are not
informed. Without more evidence than these hypotheses it
would appear difficult for the court to determine that the State
Engineer's Office and the other respondents, after many years
of study of the problem as it actually occurs on the ground,
and the trial court after hearing the evidence, have erred in
deciding that there is a reasonable cause to believe that
there is some unappropraited water in the underground source.
No evid~nce has been produced that the Midvale and
Sandy \veils are not drilled to bed rock or that at any point
across the canyon the bed rock is much· deeper than these
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wells. This same course of reasoning is_ applicable to any
and all points up and down the_ canyon until evidence to the
contrary is produced. If there is a deep deposit of tnaterial
in the canyon and a great body of water passing through it, it
is possible that a considerable portion of this water is following
along the bed rock and disappears in the fault area. In that
case, from a conservation standpoint, it should be brought to
the surface at a higher elevation than the. bottom of the valley
and put to use. Upon this .theory the wells were drilled and
more water has been made to flow by use of the pumps than
otherwise would. The additional water thereby obtained is
intended to be used by the respondents for the highest· duty
to which water can be put, natnely, culinary use. This has been
demonstrated during the past 10 years (R. 38, 49, 62), and
the State Engineer has required very much more proof than
·it normally does for the approval of an application, as evidenced by Mr. Ward's statement (R. 62). The respondents
have been patient in asking for its use while appellants continue to use the water we have pumped pending said approval.
At the present time, the respondents are in great need of the

additi~nal. \Vater and they desire to continue their proof of
appropriation. Certainly, we have met the burden for an

ap-

proval of the application at this stage.

POINT V.
EXI-lt\USTIVE AND PRAC'fiCAL QUANTITY TESTS
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE RESULTS OF WI-IICH
CONCLUSIVELY SHOW U:t'\TAPPROPRIA TED \VATER,
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ARE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE APPROVAL OF
AN APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE WAT.ER.
An analysis of appellants' Point V shows that the appel-.
lants in this point, like in every one of their other four points,
argue on the premise that this lawsuit involves the determination of relative rights rather than whether or not there is
reasonable cause to believe that there is unappropriated water
\vithin the area. They have drawn unfair inferences and conclusions not based upon the facts and evidence.
Appellants assail t~e findings and the judgment of the
trial court and its reasoning in affirming the State Engineer's
decision. In reply to such a ridiculous attack, we refer to the
last two paragraphs of the trial court's memorandum decision,
as follows:
"The Courts of this state have consistently held that
original applications for appropriation of water should
be freely granted whenever a reasonable probability
exists that further development of water resources can
be made. The public policy of the State being such, the
views of the court as expressed herein must be interpreted accordingly."
"Let judgment be entered in accord with the decision of the State Engineer.''
In attacking the judgment of the trial court the appellants have destroyed their own major premise. As previously
pointed out, the entire argument of the appellants is based
on the contention that all of the water in Little Cottonwood
Creek, including all water occurring in the watershed to its
uttermost limits, is appropriated under the terms of the Morse
41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Decree. In appellants' brief, at page 39, they say, CCWe have
no doubt that if wells were dug at or immediately above the
fault they could capture some water that had fully performed
its service to prior appropriators up the creek and so could be
taken without injury to anyone."
If this be true, then such water is unappropriated \Vater
within the confines of Little Cottonwood watershed.
The evidence clearly shows that during the period \vhen
the tests were made, the area 'vas not acting as a carrier of surface water. The only water in the creek channel was a sn1all
part of the underflow which reached the surface and which
belonged entirely to the respondents. Appellants had diverted
all of their water above the sprin~s. By the same reasoning
then, this "'ater, which no longer acts as a carrier, is unappropriated water.
The appellants ask who is capable of measuring the contribution of water to the underflow of the stream. Our answer
i.s that we, through exhaustive tests, over a period of many
years, under the supervision of competent hydraulic engineers,
have measured it. The results of our measurements are in evidence. Also, we ~ave made. it possible for the appellants to
measure it. All of the tests show that, upon cessation of pumping, while the creek above is still dry, water appears in the
.springs within a few minutes. and covers the surface of the
area in lengths of time ranging from 4 hours to 8 days. The
appell~nts insist that water cannot appear at the surface until
the underlying n1aterial is completely saturated. The various
exhibits of both parties show exact measurements as to tin1e.
As far as quantity is concerned, we have made precise measure42
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ments of the quantity of water which can be taken from the
area by our present means. This evidence is clear and uncontroverted.
Most of these matters are not at issue in considering an
application to appropriate water. Our proof has gone much
. further than the law requires. These detailed measurements
properly relate to proof of appropriation.
All witnesses agree that there is water crossing the Wasatch
Fault and excess flood water in the area which is ll:nappropriated. The respondents have drilled wells and made careful
scientific examinations for ·many. years. They have found that
they can develop and place to beneficial use a measured quantity of water. No interference has· been shown. This, then,
is the development which the appellants after examination
limited in scope and area, covering a period of 75 days, label
as an ctimpractical scheme."
We have not OI)ly borne the burden of proof, but have.
gone far beyond to inform the court fully. Upon the basis of
the appellants' evidence alone, the application should be
granted.

CONCLUSION
The tests performed by the respondents under the direction of the State Engineer were exhaustive, were more than
required by the. usual applicant, were performed during the
most ideal period possible, and were performed in an area
\vhere no other appropriator, except one not a party to this
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suit, has any diversion points. 'Ihis is indicative that if any
interference takes place, it is with ourselves. A tight dam is
tnaintained at the Sandy Ditch during this period 'vhich is
indicative that no interference could possibly be made with
either an appropriator above the South Despain Ditch or below
the Sandy Ditch. There is a natural loss. of water within the
tested area, as is evidenced by the loss in the 900 foot rocky
formation just west of the Despain Spring Area. The rate
of recharge to the Despain Spring Area was almost itnmediate
with the stopping of the pumps, all of which took place "rhen
the entire creek flow was diverted east of the area in question.
It is, therefore, submitted that applicants need only show
reasonable cause for believing that an appropriation might
be made, that it is not necessary for them to ·prove that the
exact amount applied for can be obtained; nor to know every
detail of the appropriation. Those details will be known by
the time proof of appropriation is submitted. The application
is simply a notice of intention. If approved, as it should be, the
applicant is permited to go forward to perfect a right. · The
application should not be rejected merely because they might
be· placed in a position where they can interfere with rights
of others, which we deny will take place. The evidence clearly
demonstrates that nature will not bring all of the water accunlulating in the areas in question to the surface. This ~s admitted by the appellants. Both above and below this area the.
protestants are attempting to work out projects to save the water
which nature wastes. By extensive developm~nt works in the
form of. wells and pumps, some water can be brought to the
surface which otherwise would r€main underground and not
be available at any of the protestants' points of diversion.
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LTnder the cases and the evidence, the State Engineer's and
the Trial Court's decision should be readily affinned and the
applicants permitted to proceed to perfect their rights.
We apologize to this Court for '"hat the Court may well
regard as a too lengthy brief with unnecessary repetitions and
citations. Our excuse is that the several points advanced by
the appellants to sustain their position are, at least in part, the
cause of supererogation in dealing 'vith them.
·Respectfully submitted,
VICTOR G .. SAGERS,

Attorney for Defendant and ·
Respondent, Sandy City
BEN G. BAGLEY,

Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent,_ Midvale City
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